Why was Jesus despised? by Roy Davison

http://www.oldpaths.com/Archive/Davison/Roy/Allen/1940/unpop.html

Why was Jesus despised?

Strange as it may seem, some did not like Jesus. He was a good man. He healed the sick and helped the weak. Yet, some really despised Hem. It had been foretold that the Messiah would be “despised by the people” (Psalm 22:6). “He was despised, and we did not esteem Him” (Isaiah 53:3).

To despise is to regard with contempt, to feel a strong dislike for.

Jesus explained why: “This is the condemnation, that the light has come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil” (John 3:19).

There were many religious people in Palestine at the time of Christ. One might expect them to welcome the Son of God with open arms. But they did not. Jesus was unpopular for several reasons.

He opposed traditions that were contrary to the will of God.

Many people are really attached to their traditions. They often love them more than the word of God.

Jewish religious life at the time of Christ was regulated by the Old Testament plus the writings of the rabbis. A careful distinction was made between inspired and uninspired writings. Yet, many of the rituals and regulations were based, not on the Scriptures, but on human traditions.

Jesus was unpopular with the religious leaders because He condemned traditions that were contrary to the word of God.

“Then the Pharisees and some of the scribes came together to Him, having come from Jerusalem. Now when they saw some of His disciples eat bread with defiled, that is, with unwashed hands, they found fault. For the Pharisees and all the Jews do not eat unless they wash their hands in a special way, holding the tradition of the elders” (Mark 7:1-3).

There is nothing wrong with washing your hands before you eat, but handwashing - although not commanded in the Old Testament - was viewed as an obligatory religious rite.

“Then the Pharisees and scribes asked Him, ‘Why do Your disciples not walk according to the tradition of the elders, but eat bread with unwashed hands?’ He answered and said to them, ‘Well did Isaiah prophesy of you hypocrites, as it is written: “This people honors Me with their lips, but their heart is far from Me. And in vain they worship Me, teaching as doctrines the commandments of men.” For laying aside the commandment of God, you hold the tradition of men’” (Mark 7:5-8).

Jesus applied this passage from Isaiah to the people of His time, and unfortunately, the same is true today. The religious lives of many are governed, not by the Scriptures, but by traditions that violate the Scriptures. 

Unscriptural names are worn that glorify something or someone other than Christ.

Worship is conducted according to tradition rather than the Scriptures. Roman Catholics worship images, dead people (Saints) and the Pope. Protestants celebrate Christmas and Easter according to Catholic tradition, while neglecting to have the Lord’s supper each week. People burn candles and incense, and play music instruments, forms of worship that are not prescribed in the New Testament.

Jesus said that worship based on human doctrine is in vain. To follow Christ, we must put aside human traditions and be led by the word of God.

But many love their traditions more than God’s word. With such people, Christ is not really popular. A man may praise the Lord a thousand times with his lips, but if he is following the doctrines of men, his worship is to no avail.

Jesus was unpopular because He emphasized spiritual values and taught the futility of material things.

At first Jesus was popular because of His healings and His miraculous feeding of nine thousand people. But when He refused to become a worldly king (John 6:15) and said, “I am the bread of life” and “It is the Spirit who gives life; the flesh profits nothing” (John 6:48, 63), His popularity evaporated.

“From that time many of His disciples went back and walked with Him no more. Then Jesus said to the twelve, ‘Do you also want to go away?’ But Simon Peter answered Him, ‘Lord, to whom shall we go? You have the words of eternal life’” (John 6:66-68). 

Jesus told a rich young man who kept the ten commandments: “‘If you want to be perfect, go, sell what you have and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; and come, follow Me.’ But when the young man heard that saying, he went away sorrowful, for he had great possessions. Then Jesus said to His disciples, ‘Assuredly, I say to you that it is hard for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven. And again I say to you, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God’” (Matthew 19:21-24).

This man carefully observed the ten commandments, but material wealth was the focus of his life, and it was hard for him to put his wealth aside to follow Christ.

Jesus said, “No servant can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other, or else he will be loyal to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve God and mammon” (Luke 16:13). Mammon is material wealth. One cannot devote his life both to God and to material wealth.

“Now the Pharisees, who were lovers of money, also heard all these things, and they derided Him” (Luke 16:14). The Pharisees despised Jesus because they were “money-lovers.” (“Lovers of money” is one word in Greek.)

Many people today, even though they are Christians, even though they attend services regularly, might be lost because their lives are focused on material things. They are so busy earning money that they have little time for spiritual endeavors. Their house and car payments are so high that they have little left for benevolence and the work of the Lord. They live in luxury but lack treasure in heaven.

The apostle Matthew, also called Levi, left his money to follow Christ: “And as He passed by, He saw Levi the son of Alphaeus sitting at the tax office, and said to him, ‘Follow Me.’ And he arose and followed Him” (Mark 2:14).

One man wanted Jesus to help him get a share of an inheritance. Notice how Jesus responded: “Then one from the crowd said to Him, ‘Teacher, tell my brother to divide the inheritance with me.’ But He said to him, ‘Man, who made Me a judge or an arbitrator over you?’ But He said to them, ‘Take heed and beware of covetousness, for one’s life does not consist in the abundance of the things he possesses’” (Luke 12:13-15). Jesus refuses to deal with the validity of the request but goes to the core of the problem and condemns the covetousness of both brothers.

“Then He spoke a parable to them, saying: ‘The ground of a certain rich man yielded plentifully. And he thought within himself, saying, “What shall I do, since I have no room to store my crops?” So he said, “I will do this: I will pull down my barns and build greater, and there I will store all my crops and my goods. And I will say to my soul, ‘Soul, you have many goods laid up for many years; take your ease; eat, drink, and be merry.’” But God said to him, “You fool! This night your soul will be required of you; then whose will those things be which you have provided?” So is he who lays up treasure for himself, and is not rich toward God’” (Luke 12:16-21).

Jesus would not fit in our modern society at all! What a statement! Heavenly treasure is more important than earthly treasure! Jesus obviously never watched television!

Many years ago a man in Belgium became a Christen but fell away after a time. When I visited him he said that he had experienced more disadvantages than advantages from being a Christian. Through the years he saved money to buy a cottage in Spain - where the weather is nice - for his retirement years. But a few years before he could retire, he died.

Jesus spoke the truth about the futility of worldly wealth: “For what is a man profited if he gains the whole world, and loses his own soul?” (Matthew 16:26).

Also in our time, Jesus is definitely not popular with materially- minded people. They did not like Him then, and they do not like Him now. They may pretend to serve Him, but actually they serve themselves.

Jesus wants us to dedicate our lives to doing good. We ought to help others and contribute something worthwhile to society. But many spend their time mainly taking care of themselves, increasing material ease, while others are in need. We must repent if we want to be true followers of Christ.

Jesus was unpopular because He exposed the sinfulness of self- righteous people and called sinners to repentance.

Jesus was most disliked by the so-called religious people of His time. He embarrassed them because He ate with sinners. When criticized for this He replied: “I did not come to call the righteous, but sinners, to repentance” (Matthew 9:13).

People who realized that they needed forgiveness, liked Jesus because He encouraged them to leave their sinful ways and live new lives under His leadership.

People who thought they were righteous, hated Jesus because He condemned their hypocrisy. “Then Jesus spoke to the multitudes and to His disciples, saying: ‘The scribes and the Pharisees sit in Moses’s seat. Therefore whatever they tell you to observe, that observe and do, but do not do according to their works; for they say, and do not do. For they bind heavy burdens, hard to bear, and lay them on men’s shoulders; but they themselves will not move them with one of their fingers. But all their works they do to be seen by men’” (Matthew 23:1- 5). 

Jesus evaluated people on the basis of their spiritual attitude and not on the basis of their outward show of religion.

How many churches and people today give an outward show of religion, but will have nothing to do with those who are lost? They pray long prayers but do little to help the poor and sinful. They look down on them and do not want to be seen in their company.

Jesus associated with the lowly. If we want to be followers of Christ we must do what we can to help the sinful and the poor.

Paul said a time would come when many would have nothing but an empty shell of religion: “But know this, that in the last days perilous times will come: For men will be lovers of themselves, lovers of money, boasters, proud, blasphemers, disobedient to parents, unthankful, unholy, unloving, unforgiving, slanderers, without self-control, brutal, despisers of good, traitors, headstrong, haughty, lovers of pleasure rather than lovers of God, having a form of godliness but denying its power. And from such people turn away!” (2 Timothy 3:1-5).

Jesus was unpopular for various reasons.

He opposed human traditions that are contrary to the will of God.

He emphasized spiritual values and taught the futility of material things.

He exposed the sinfulness of self-righteous people and called sinners to repentance.

Jesus was unpopular in His day and He is unpopular with most people today.

But we pray that you will make Him King of your life. Take up your cross and follow Him. Free yourself from human traditions. Seek the kingdom of God rather than material gain. Repent of your sins. Go to Christ for forgiveness and be His messenger to help others find the way. If you do this, you will no doubt be unpopular with many. But you will please Christ, and when He comes again, He will recognize you as His own. Amen.

Roy Davison

The Scripture quotations in this article are from
The New King James Version. ©1979,1980,1982, Thomas Nelson Inc., Publishers unless indicated otherwise.
Permission for reference use has been granted.

Published in The Old Paths Archive
http://www.oldpaths.com

In What Order Did Satan Tempt Jesus? by Eric Lyons, M.Min.

http://apologeticspress.org/AllegedDiscrepancies.aspx?article=746&b=Luke

In What Order Did Satan Tempt Jesus?

by Eric Lyons, M.Min.

If you have ever compared Matthew’s account of Satan tempting Jesus in the wilderness with Luke’s account, you quickly will notice that there is a difference in the sequence of the recorded events (Matthew 4:1-11; Luke 4:1-13). Both Matthew and Luke agree that Satan first tested Jesus by challenging Him to turn stones to bread. However, while the two disciples of Jesus agree on the content of the next two tests, the second and third temptations recorded by Matthew are “flip-flopped” in Luke’s account. Matthew recorded that Satan’s second temptation involved him trying to persuade Jesus to throw Himself down off the pinnacle of the temple. The third temptation listed by Matthew was Satan’s attempt to get Jesus to worship him. Even though Luke mentioned the same two events, he listed them in the reverse order— Satan first desired adoration from Jesus, and then he challenged Him to throw Himself down off the pinnacle of the temple. Based upon this difference, skeptics claim we have a clear-cut discrepancy.

The problem with this allegation is that it is based upon an assumption. Those who claim that the “disorder” of temptations is a contradiction, presuppose that history always is written (or spoken) chronologically. However, common sense tells us otherwise. Open almost any world history textbook and you will see that even though most events are recorded chronologically, some are arranged topically. For example, in one chapter you may read about the European civilization in the late Middle Ages (A.D. 1000-1300). Yet, in the very next chapter you might learn about Medieval India (150 B.C.-A.D. 1400). Authors arrange textbooks thematically in order to reduce the confusion that would arise if every event in world history textbooks were arranged chronologically. Even when we rehearse life experiences to friends and family, oftentimes we speak climactically rather than chronologically. A teenager may return home from an amusement park and tell his father about all of the roller coasters he rode at Six Flags. Likely, rather than mentioning all of them in the order he rode them, he will start with the most exciting ones and end with the boring ones (if there is such thing as a “boring” roller coaster).

Had Matthew and Luke claimed to arrange the temptations of Jesus chronologically, skeptics would have a legitimate case. But, the fact of the matter is, neither Matthew nor Luke ever claimed such. Either one of the two gospel writers recorded these events in the order they happened, or both of them wrote topically. Most biblical scholars believe that Matthew was concerned more with the order of events in this story because of his use of words like “then” (4:5, Greek tote) and “again” (4:8, Greek palin). These two adverbs seem to indicate a more sequential order of the temptations. Luke simply links the events by using the Greek words kai and de (4:2, 5-6, translated “and”). [The NKJV’s translation of kai as “then” in Luke 4:5 is incorrect. It should be translated simply “and” (cf. KJV, ASV, NASV, and RSV)]. Similar to the English word “and” not having specific chronological implications, neither do the Greek words kai and de (Richards, 1993, p. 230). In short, Luke’ s account of the temptations of Jesus is arranged topically (or possibly climactically), whereas Matthew’s account seems to be arranged chronologically.

This is just one more example of an alleged Bible contradiction that has been refuted rather easily by a proper use of both “reason” and “revelation.”

REFERENCES

Richards, Larry (1993), 735 Baffling Bible Questions Answered (Grand Rapids, MI: Revell).

“Jesus Didn’t Condemn Homosexuality” by Kyle Butt, M.Div.

http://apologeticspress.org/APContent.aspx?category=7&article=1627

“Jesus Didn’t Condemn Homosexuality”

by	Kyle Butt, M.Div.

By and large, the American culture is aggressively promoting the sinful lifestyle of homosexuality. In the midst of such pressure, many people who call themselves Christians are caving in and accepting this perverted lifestyle in spite of God’s clear teachings against it (Butt, 2003). Just recently, the country singer Carrie Underwood stated that her Christian faith led her to support gay marriage (Nilles, 2012). In truth, the life and teachings of Jesus Christ could never be accurately understood to lead a person to conclude that homosexual marriage is moral (Miller and Harrub, 2004).

One of the most common arguments made in support of homosexuality is that Jesus Christ did not explicitly condemn the practice. Supposedly, since Jesus never stated specifically: “Homosexuality is a sin,” then His failure to denounce the lifestyle can be interpreted to mean that He approved of it. This reasoning is riddled with error.

First, Jesus explained to His followers that He did not have time to teach them everything they needed to know. He told them that the Holy Spirit would bring to their remembrance all that He had taught, and would include additional teaching that He had not had time to cover. He told His disciples: “I still have many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now. However, when He, the Spirit of truth has come, He will guide you into all truth” (John 16:12-13). When we look to the inspired writings of the New Testament, we see the authors boldly and specifically condemning the practice based on the revelation they received from the Holy Spirit (Miller and Harrub, 2004). Thus, it is wrong to suggest that only the “words in red” are Jesus’ teachings. On the contrary, He foretold that more teaching would be done after His return to heaven due to the fact that the apostles “could not bear” all of it at the time.

Second, even if Jesus did not explicitly condemn the practice (though He actually did, as will be noted later), that certainly could not be used as evidence that He condoned the practice. For instance, where does Jesus explicitly state that bestiality is wrong? Where in the New Testament does Jesus state that polygamy is wrong? Where are the “words in red” that specifically condemn pedophilia? Are we to suppose that the Son of God condoned using crystal meth because there is not an explicit statement from Jesus’ mouth that says “do not smoke crystal meth?” The idea that silence from Jesus on a subject means He approved of or condoned the practice cannot be substantiated.

Finally, it must be considered that Jesus did, in fact, speak against homosexuality. On numerous occasions, Jesus condemned the sins of adultery (Matthew 19:18), sexual immorality (Matthew 19:9) and fornication (Matthew 15:19). These terms describe any type of sexual intercourse that is not within the confines of a marriage ordained by God. Jesus then proceeded to define exactly what God views as a morally permissible marriage. He stated:

Have you not read that He who made them at the beginning made them male and female, and said, “For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh”? So then, they are no longer two but one flesh. Therefore what God has joined together, let not man separate (Matthew 19:4-6).

By defining marriage as between one male and one female, Jesus effectively condemned all other arrangements, including but not limited to one man and two women, one woman and two men, three men and one woman, three men and three women, one man and one man, one woman and one animal, etc. You can see the overwhelming logic of such. For Jesus to have to explicitly condemn every assortment of genders and numbers would be absurd. When He defined marriage between one man and one woman, He clearly showed that such an arrangement is the only one authorized by God.

Several years ago a man named Cory Moore “legally married his 2004 Cherry ES-335” Gibson guitar (“Man Marries Guitar,” 2007). He said: “The day I got her, I just knew she was the one…. I know it seems weird, but I really love her—like, really love her, with all my heart. I just wanted to make it official” (2007). Are we to conclude that because Jesus never specifically condemned a man marrying his guitar then the Son of God approved of such? To ask is to answer. In 2006, 41-year-old Sharon Tendler married a dolphin (“Woman Marries Dolphin,” 2006). Jesus never said one word explicitly about refraining from marrying a dolphin. Does that mean His “silence” should be viewed as approval? Not in any way.

Homosexuality is a sin. It always has been, and it always will be. The inspired New Testament writers repeatedly teach that to be the case. Jesus explained that the Holy Spirit would bring to the inspired writers information that they could not handle at the time of His departing. In addition, Jesus did explicitly define marriage as being between one man and one woman. The ruse to suggest that Jesus approves of homosexuality because He never expressly condemned it cannot be sustained logically, nor can it be defended on any type of moral grounds. The person who presumes to claim to be a Christian, and yet supports homosexuality, misunderstands the teachings of Christ and needs to repent and stop approving of a perverted, destructive practice that Jesus condemns (Matthew 19:1-9).

REFERENCES

Butt, Kyle (2003), “Homosexuality—Sin, or Cultural Bad Habit?” Apologetics Press,http://www.apologeticspress.org/apcontent.aspx?category=7&article=1239.

“Man Marries Guitar” (2007), http://www.messandnoise.com/discussions/865688.

Miller, Dave and Brad Harrub (2004), “An Investigation of the Biblical Evidence Against Homosexuality,” Apologetics Press, http://www.apologeticspress.org/apPubPage.aspx?pub=1&issue=557.

Nilles, Billy (2012), “Carrie Underwood Reveals She Supports Gay Marriage,” http://www.hollywoodlife.com/2012/06/11/carrie-underwood-supports-gay-marriage-christian/.

“Woman Marries Dolphin” (2006), http://www.theage.com.au/news/world/woman-marries-dolphin/2006/01/01/1136050339590.html.

"I Do not Want to Be a Fool" by Bert Thompson, Ph.D.

http://apologeticspress.org/APContent.aspx?category=9&article=460

"I Do not Want to Be a Fool"

by	Bert Thompson, Ph.D.

INTRODUCTION

Through our mail box in a year’s time come hundreds of letters. Some are from evolutionists or those sympathetic to them, boldly objecting to our work. Some are from friends, offering a word of encouragement. Some are from students, writing to ask for materials they can use in the preparation of a term paper, speech, or debate. And some are from people whose faith is faltering because it has been attacked by unbelief and is in danger of being destroyed.

This article concerns a letter from the latter category. A Christian student’s graduate program in the sciences at a state university led him to study under a man he termed “a giant in his field...rocket-scientist intelligent...and a devout evolutionist.” In his letter, the student said:

...working this closely with one who thinks as he does is beginning to cause not a small amount of cognitive dissonance in my own mind with regards evolution v. special creation. I really need your help, both as a Christian and a scientist, to clearly see what it is. Hundreds of thousands of scientists can’t be wrong, can they? Consensual validation cannot be pushed aside in science. How can that many people be following a flag with no carrier, and someone not find out? The number of creation scientists pales in comparison.... I do not want to be a fool.”

“COGNITIVE DISSONANCE”

This young writer expressed what many people experience, yet are unable to enunciate so eloquently. It is not uncommon to encounter those who once knew what they believed and why they believed it, yet who now are terribly confused. “Cognitive dissonance” is the internal struggle one experiences when presented with new information that contradicts what he believes to be true. As he struggles for consistency, he must change what he believes or disregard the new information. This young Christian who once knew what he believed, and why he believed it, no longer knows either. He stated: “I am a confused young man with some serious questions about my mind, my faith, and my God. Please help me sort through these questions....”

There were two things he did know, however. First, he recognized that the beliefs he once held were inconsistent with those he was being taught. Second, he recognized that if he accepted these new teachings, then not only his beliefs but his actions would be inconsistent with his Christianity. His plea—“help me sort through these questions”—has been echoed countless times through the centuries by those who languish in the “cognitive dissonance” which results from replacing the wisdom of God with the wisdom of man. What answer could we give the young querist?

“CONSENSUAL VALIDATION”

It is true that “most scientists” accept organic evolution. The co-discoverer of the DNAmolecule, James Watson, once stated: “Today the theory of evolution is an accepted fact for everyone but a fundamentalist minority” (1987, p. 2). One university textbook widely used for almost two decades began with these words: “Organic evolution is the greatest principle in biology. Its implications extend far beyond the confines of that science, ramifying into all phases of human life and activity. Accordingly, understanding of evolution should be part of the intellectual equipment of all educated persons” (Moody, 1962, p. 1x). In the March 1987 issue ofNatural History, evolutionist Douglas J. Futuyma noted:

That evolution has occurred—that diverse organisms have descended from common ancestors by a history of modification and divergence—is accepted as fact by virtually all biologists.... The historical reality of evolution is doubted chiefly by creationists, mostly on doctrinaire religious grounds (96[3]:34).

This kind of diatribe—that evolution is a “fact” accepted by “all educated persons” except a “fundamentalist minority”—has a devastating impact on impressionable young minds. Two questions are therefore in order. First, why do so many scientists believe in evolution? Second, are they correct in doing so; that is to say, is “consensual validation” reason enough to acquiesce in favor of organic evolution?

Why Do So Many Scientists Believe in Evolution?

There are a number of reasons that could be offered to explain why belief in evolution is popular, but two seem especially apropos here. First, for those who do not believe in a Creator, evolution is their only escape. Henry Fairfield Osborn, renowned evolutionist of the early twentieth century, suggested: “In truth, from the earliest stages of Greek thought man has been eager to discover some natural cause of evolution, and to abandon the idea of supernatural intervention in the order of nature” (1918, p. ix). British evolutionist Sir Arthur Keith once remarked that “Evolution is unproved and unprovable. We believe it because the only alternative is special creation, and that is unthinkable!” (as quoted in Criswell, 1972, p. 73). D.M.S. Watson, who held the position of the Chair of Evolution at the University of London for more than twenty years, echoed the same sentiments when he stated that “Evolution itself is accepted by zoologists, not because it has been observed to occur or can be proven by logically coherent evidence to be true, but because the only alternative, special creation, is incredible” (1929, p. 233). As Henry Morris has noted: “Evolution is the natural way to explain the origin of things for those who do not know and acknowledge the true God of creation. In fact, some kind of evolution is absolutely necessary for those who would reject God” (1966, p. 98).

Second, it may be that “The main reason most educated people believe in evolution is simply because they have been told that most educated people believe in evolution” (Morris, 1974, p. 26). Many people, including scientists, fall into this category. For the past century, evolution has been taught from kindergarten to graduate school as a fact that “all reputable scientists believe.” As a result, people often believe that if they, too, wish to be “educated,” it is a prerequisite that they believe in evolution. Where, in all likelihood, did the graduate student’s professor receive his education? At the feet of evolutionists, no doubt. And where did they, in turn, receive their education? At the feet of evolutionists. Thus, the vicious circle continues unabated.

Are “Hundreds of Thousands of Scientists” Correct?

The graduate student asked: “Hundreds of thousands of scientists can’t be wrong, can they?” This question may be addressed as follows. First, any argument based on “counting heads” is fallacious. Philosophy professors instruct their students on various fallacies of human thought, one of which is the “fallacy of consensus.” In his book, Fundamentals of Critical Thinking, atheistic philosopher Paul Ricci discussed the “argument from consensus,” and explained its erroneous nature (1986, p. 175). Interestingly, however, in the pages prior to his discussion, Mr. Ricci offered the following as proof of evolution: “The reliability of evolution not only as a theory but as a principle of understanding is not contested by the vast majority of biologists, geologists, astronomers, and other scientists” (1986, p. 172, emp. added).

Mr. Ricci fell victim to the very fallacy about which he tried to warn his readers—truth is not determined by popular opinion or majority vote. A thing may be, and often is, true even when accepted only by a small minority. The history of science is replete with such examples. British medical doctor, Edward Jenner (1749-1823), was scorned when he suggested that he had produced a smallpox vaccine by infecting people with a less-virulent strain of the disease-causing organism. Afterwards, he lived as a man whose reputation had been sullied. Yet his vaccine helped the World Health Organization eradicate smallpox. Ignaz Semmelweis (1818-1865) of Austria is another interesting case study. He noticed the high mortality rate among surgical patients, and suggested that the deaths resulted from surgeons washing neither their hands nor their instruments between patients. Dr. Semmelweis asked them to do so, but they ridiculed him. Today, the solutions posed by this gentle doctor are the basis of antiseptic techniques in life-saving surgery.

Often, scientific successes have occurred because researchers rebelled against the status quo. Sometimes consensual validation must be set aside for the sake of truth. If it is not, those of us who work in science shall become little more than cookie-cutter scientists rushing to fit into a predetermined mold.

Darrell Huff correctly observed: “People can be wrong in the mass, just as they can individually” (1959, p. 122). If something is true, stating it a million times does not make it any truer. Similarly, if something is false, stating it a million times does not make it true. And the prestige of a position’s advocates has nothing to do with whether or not the fact is true or false. It is incorrect (to use one example) to suggest that because a Nobel laureate states something it is true by definition. Were that the case, when Nobel laureate W.B. Shockley suggested that highly intelligent women be artificially inseminated using spermatozoa from Nobel Prize winners to produce superintelligent offspring, we should have taken him up on his suggestion. Of course, such an idea was based on nothing more than the narcissistic dreamings of an over-inflated ego. As Taylor has commented: “Status in the field of science is no guarantee of the truth” (1984, p. 226). Factual knowledge is not based on: (a) the number of people supporting the claim; or (b) the importance of the one(s) making that claim.

Second, the idea of strict objectivity in science is a myth. While scientists like to think of themselves as broad-minded, unprejudiced paragons of virtue, the fact is that they, too, on occasion, suffer from bouts of bias, bigotry, and presuppositionalism. Another Nobel laureate, James Watson, remarked rather bluntly: “In contrast to the popular conception supported by newspapers and mothers of scientists, a goodly number of scientists are not only narrow-minded and dull, but also just stupid” (1968, p. 14).

History provides a sad but instructive example of how scientists sometimes treat their colleagues when “consensual validation” is threatened. Immanuel Velikovsky was a medical doctor, and a scholar in his own right. He was also an “evolutionary catastrophist” (a rarity in the evolutionary community). Dr. Velikovsky believed, among other things, that the miracles described in the Bible actually occurred, but that they had purely natural explanations. His books (Earth in Upheaval,Worlds in Collision, Ages in Chaos, and others) challenged much evolutionary thought, and caused ripples of global proportions in the scientific community. The ensuing controversy was not a pretty sight (see de Grazia, 1966; Talbott, 1976). In their book, Velikovsky Reconsidered, the editors of Pensée magazine offered the following assessment of what occurred in this instance:

The professional scientists’ campaign against Worlds in Collision began well before the book appeared. Harlow Shapley, probably the best-known American astronomer alive today, led an energetic attempt to stop the publisher, Macmillan, from publishing the book. He arranged for denunciations of the book, still before its appearance, by an astronomer, a geologist, and an archaeologist in a learned journal. None of them had read the book. When it did appear, denunciatory reviews were arranged, again, in several instances, by professors who boasted of never having read the book.

Velikovsky was rigorously excluded from access to learned journals for his replies. Then Shapley and others really got busy on the old-boy circuit. They forced the sacking of the senior editor of Macmillan responsible for accepting the Velikovsky manuscript. (He had been with the firm twenty-five years.) They forced the sacking of the director of the famous Hayden Planetarium in New York, because he proposed to take Velikovsky seriously enough to mount a display about the theory.

...The process thus begun did not stop. ...a great many “refutations” of Velikovsky’s theory have appeared in print, some by very famous people.... Some of them are chiefly remarkable for dishonesty or incompetence. They misquote the text they are criticizing. They willfully misrepresent the theory Velikovsky advanced. And they are replete with errors of fact and theory (Talbott, 1976, pp. 38,39).

Eventually, Macmillan was forced to transfer Velikovsky’s works to its competitor, Doubleday, which had no textbook division and thus was not subject to the blackmail that Shapley and his evolutionary colleagues were perpetrating. The whole sordid affair was made public in Dr. Velikovsky’s last book, Stargazers and Gravediggers (1984), published posthumously at his request.

Dr. Velikovsky’s treatment was scandalous, and remains a source of embarrassment to every scientist. Science is alleged to be self-testing and self-correcting. Even unorthodox views supposedly are welcome, since once put to the test, they will be weeded out if incorrect. But to deny someone the right to set forward a theory is not science—it is bigotry. While I as a scientist certainly do not share most of Velikovsky’s views, I delight in the fact that science has room in its investigative method and procedures for even the most unlikely candidate of a theory.

Newspaper magnate William Randolph Hurst, Jr. once wrote about pressures from “fashionable ideas...which are advanced with such force that common sense itself becomes the victim.” He observed that a person under such pressure may then act “with an irrationality which is almost beyond belief ” (1971, p. A-4). This is exactly what happened in the cases of Jenner, Semmelweis, and Velikovsky—and the list could be extended with ease. Common sense became the victim, and people acted irrationally. Were “the scientists” in the majority? Indeed. Were they wrong? Yes. Just because “hundreds of thousands of scientists” believe something does not make it right.

“THOU SHALT NOT FOLLOW A MULTITUDE TO DO EVIL”

Christ, in His “Sermon on the Mount,” warned that “narrow is the gate and difficult is the way which leads to life, and there are few who find it” (Matthew 7:14). The majority ultimately will abandon God’s wisdom in favor of their own. Moses commanded the Israelites: “Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil” (Exodus 23:2). Regarding this passage, Guy N. Woods has observed that this divine injunction

...was designed to guard the Lord’s people from the corrupting influences of an evil environment, as well as from the powerful appeals of mob psychology to which so many in every generation succumb....

Man, by nature, is a social and gregarious being, tending to flock or gather together with others of his kind.... Man may, and often does, imbibe the evil characteristics of those about him as readily, and often more so, than the good ones (1982, 124[1]:2).

Yes, there are “hundreds of thousands of scientists” who reject the biblical account of creation. But, as Woods noted, “It is dangerous to follow the multitude because the majority is almost always on the wrong side in this world” (1982, 124[1]:2, emp. added). The “wisdom” with which we are impressed is not always the wisdom with which we should be impressed. Paul told the Corinthian Christians:

For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the discernment of the discerning will I bring to naught. Where is the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputer of this world? Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? For seeing that in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom knew not God, it was God’s good pleasure through the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe (1 Corinthians 1:19-21).

It should not be surprising that so many “intelligent” people view creation, and Christianity, as the fool’s way out. Paul himself commented that “not many wise after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, are called: but God chose the foolish things of the world, that he might put to shame them that are wise; and God chose the weak things of the world, that he might put to shame the things that are strong” (1 Corinthians 1:26-27). Those highly intelligent are often the least interested in spiritual matters because “the god of this world” (2 Corinthians 4:3-4) has blinded their minds so that they cannot, or will not, see the truth. They ignore the fact that “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom” (Proverbs 1:7).

We must not fall prey to mob psychology—the idea which suggests because “everyone is doing it” that somehow makes it right. Nor should we believe that “science” provides the answer to every conceivable question.

To treat science as a secular substitute for God is not only naive, it is idolatry.... Science and technology are the activities of imperfect people. The tendencies to misuse and exploit for personal gain operate here as in every other department of life. But the answer to abuse is not disuse, but responsible use (Poole, 1990, p. 126).

CONCLUSION

The graduate student said, “I do not want to be a fool.” It was a joy to tell him that he does not have to bear that stigma. The Scriptures are clear: “The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God” (Psalm 14:1). We need not be intimidated by the pseudo-intellectualism of those who esteem themselves with higher regard than they do their Creator. The cartoon character Lucy was correct when she told Charlie Brown, “You’re not right; you just sound right!”

At times, we need to focus on these issues and remember that it is far more important to study, and submit to, the Word of God than it is to be able to explain the ins and outs of quantum physics. One of those will “abide forever” (Isaiah 40:8); the other will perish. One of the graduate student’s final questions was: “How, then, may we compete?” Frankly, there may be times when we cannot. We run a different race, operated by different rules. While the world may esteem us not at all, the One Who will eventually judge us shall esteem us as “sons by adoption,” and “heirs of the kingdom.” Who, then, shall have played the fool?

REFERENCES

de Grazia, Alfred, R. Juergens and L. Stecchini, eds. (1966), The Velikovsky Affair (Hyde Park, NY: University Books).

Futuyma, Douglas J. (1987), “World Without Design,” Natural History, 96[3]:34, March.

Huff, Darrell (1959), How to Take a Chance (New York: W.W. Norton).

Hurst, Jr., William Randolph (1971), “Editor’s Report,” in The [Los Angeles] Herald-Examiner, November 14.

Criswell, W.A. (1972), Did Man Just Happen? (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan).

Moody, Paul A. (1962), Introduction to Evolution (New York: Harper & Row).

Morris, Henry M. (1966), Studies in the Bible and Science (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker).

Morris, Henry M. (1974), The Twilight of Evolution (San Diego, CA: Creation-Life Publishers).

Osborn, Henry Fairfield (1918), The Origin and Evolution of Life (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons).

Poole, Michael (1990), A Guide to Science and Belief (Oxford, England: Lion).

Ricci, Paul (1986), Fundamentals of Critical Thinking (Lexington, MA: Ginn Press).

Talbott, Stephen L., ed. (1976), Velikovsky Reconsidered (New York: Warner).

Taylor, Ian (1984), In the Minds of Men (Toronto, Canada: TFE Publishing).

Velikovsky, Immanuel (1984), Stargazers and Gravediggers (New York: Quill).

Watson, D.M.S. (1929), “Adaptation,” Nature, Vol. 123.

Watson, James D. (1968), The Double Helix (New York: Atheneum).

Watson, James D. (1987), Molecular Biology of the Gene (New York: W.A. Benjamin).

Woods, Guy N. (1982), “ ‘And be not Conformed to this World,’ ” Gospel Advocate, 124[1]:2, January 7.

Can We Prove Jesus Was a Real Person? by Eric Lyons, M.Min.

http://apologeticspress.org/APContent.aspx?category=10&article=876

Can We Prove Jesus Was a Real Person?

by	Eric Lyons, M.Min.

You may find this surprising, but there are many people in the world today who actually think that Jesus is nothing more than a fantasy figure that various secret societies created 2,000 years ago. Allegedly, His name belongs in the same fictional writings that contain such fairy-tale characters as Peter Pan, Hercules, and Snow White and the seven dwarfs. Gerald Massey, in his book, Gnostic and Historic Christianity, has “informed” us that “[w]hether considered as the God made human, or as man made divine, this character [Jesus—EL] never existed as a person” (1985, p. 22). Skeptics like Massey, Acharya (1999), and others believe that Christians have been deceived into thinking that there really was a man named Jesus, when, in fact, He never lived.

How do those of us who believe in the historicity of Jesus Christ respond to such allegations? Can we really know that there was a sinless, miracle-working, death-defying man named Jesus who lived upon the Earth approximately 2,000 years ago, or have we accepted His existence blindly?

Even though the New Testament proves beyond the shadow of a doubt that Jesus actually lived, it is by no means the only historical evidence available. Around the year A.D. 94, a Jewish historian by the name of Josephus mentioned Jesus’ name twice in his book, Antiquities of the Jews. In section 18 of that work, Josephus wrote: “And there arose about this time Jesus, a wise man, if indeed we should call him a man; for he was a doer of marvelous deeds, a teacher of men who receive the truth with pleasure” (emp. added). Then, in section 20, Josephus documented how a man named Ananus brought before the Sanhedrin “a man named James, the brother of Jesus who was called the Christ, and certain others” (emp. added).

About 20 years later, Tacitus, a Roman historian, wrote a book surveying the history of Rome. In it he described how Nero (the Roman emperor) “punished with every refinement the notoriously depraved Christians (as they were popularly called).” He went on to write that “their originator,Christ, had been executed in Tiberius’ reign by the governor of Judea, Pontius Pilatus” (Annals15:44, emp. added). Even though Tacitus, Josephus, and other historians from the first and second centuries A.D. were not followers of Christ, they did have something to say about Him—and they even verified that Jesus was a real person Who was so famous that He even attracted the attention of the Roman emperor himself!

Another obvious reason to believe that Jesus was a real person is because our entire dating method is based upon His existence. The letters “B.C.” stand for “before Christ,” and the letters “A.D.” (standing for Anno Domini) mean “in the year of the Lord.” So when a history teacher speaks of Alexander the Great ruling much of the world in 330 B.C., he or she is admitting that Alexander lived about 330 years before Jesus was born.

Even though this is only a sampling of the evidence relating to the man known as Jesus, it is enough to prove that He was a real person, and not just some imaginary character. We do not accept His existence blindly—it is a historical fact!

REFERENCES

Josephus, Flavius (1957 reprint), The Life and Works of Flavius Josephus, trans. William Whitson (Philadelphia, PA: John Whitson).

Massey, Gerald (1985), Gnostic and Historic Christianity (Edmond, WA: Holmes Publishing Group).

Acharya, S. (1999), The Christ Conspiracy: The Greatest Story Ever Sold (Kempton, IL: Adventures Unlimited Press).

Tacitus, Cornelius P. (1952 reprint), The Annals and the Histories, trans. Michael Grant (Chicago, IL: William Benton), Great Books of the Western World Series.

“Our God is a Consuming Fire” by Kyle Butt, M.Div.

http://apologeticspress.org/APContent.aspx?category=11&article=1376

“Our God is a Consuming Fire”

by	Kyle Butt, M.Div.

In an effort to bolster the idea that the punishment of the wicked in the afterlife will be annihilation, proponents of annihilationism frequently have focused on the biblical terms “consume” and “consuming.” Since the Bible does indeed say that “our God is a consuming fire” (Hebrews 12:29), and since the words “consume” and “consuming” can, and sometimes do, refer to the annihilation of physical matter, then many annihilationists have asserted that God will annihilate the souls of wicked humans. Homer Hailey, in his posthumously published book, God’s Judgements and Punishments, has an entire chapter titled “Our God—A Consuming Fire.” In that chapter, he deals almost entirely with the Old Testament usage of the terms “consume” and “consuming.” Concerning these terms, he remarked:

The word needing a clear definition is “consume” or “consuming.” The English word is translated from so many Hebrew words, and the Hebrew words are translated by so many English words, that it is difficult to find a precise definition for “consume.” It is best therefore to learn its meaning from usage and examples (2003, p. 136).

Hailey then proceeded to the burning bush passage, in which Moses approached the bush that “burned with fire” but “was not consumed” (Exodus 3:2). Hailey concluded: “In this instance, ‘consumed’ meant ‘burned up’ ” (p. 136). He then cited an example of a burnt offering being “consumed” on the altar (Leviticus 9:23-24) as evidence to suggest that “consumed” means to burn up.

After listing these non-human subjects of consumption, Hailey listed several Old Testament examples in which sinful humans are said to have been “consumed”: “Let sinners be consumed out of the earth. And let the wicked be no more” (Psalm 104:35); “But the wicked shall perish, and the enemies of Jehovah shall be as the fat of lambs: they shall consume; in smoke shall they consume away” (Psalm 37: 20). Hailey also listed the rebellion of Korah, where God told Moses and Aaron to get away from the rebels “that I may consume them in a moment” (Numbers 16:21). And later in the same context, God sent a plague among the people in which God made the same comment about consuming them as He did concerning the rebels in verse 21.

When it came time to summarize his chapter, Hailey placed two columns at the top of the final page, one titled “What is Said,” and the other titled “What is Not Said.” In the “What is Said” column, he listed Hebrews 12:29, Numbers 16 and Deuteronomy 4:24. Then he listed the “means of consuming,” and recorded the Earth swallowing the rebels with Korah, the plague, and fire arriving from heaven. In the “What is Not Said” column, the entire text under the column is one line that reads: “That they all burn forever” (p. 139). He obviously was attempting to lead the reader to conclude that consume and consuming must mean annihilation.

Is it correct to understand that the biblical use of the words “consume” and “consuming” mustentail that the souls of the wicked will be annihilated? Simply put, no. First, in order to conclude that the words imply annihilation, Hailey provided examples like the burning bush and the burning of an offering that do refer to the item being consumed—burned up completely. Conspicuously missing, however, are those examples in which the item that is consumed is not burned up completely. The Hebrew words translated “to consume” can mean any number of things, including: “to eat, devour, slay, to be wasted, to be destroyed, to feed, exterminate, to cause to cease, be accomplished, and exhaust, among others” (see “Akal,” 1999; “Kalah,” 1999). Are there examples in which the terms “consume” and “consuming” do not insinuate total incineration? Certainly. For instance, in Jeremiah 14, the Lord commented that He by no means would accept the idolatrous Israelites, and then stated: “But I will consume them by the sword, by the famine, and by the pestilence” (14:12). Would their being consumed necessitate that their bodies would be completely burned into nonexistence? The text answered that question when it stated that the bodies of those consumed would “be cast out in the streets of Jerusalem because of the famine and the sword; they will have no one to bury them” (14:12). The consuming taking place in Jeremiah obviously did not entail a complete burning up, but instead a punishment of physical death in which the bodies of those who were consumed would still remain for some time to decay in the open streets.

Again, in Genesis 31:15, Rachel and Leah, in their discussion of their father’s behavior, commented: “Are we not considered strangers by him? For he has sold us, and also completely consumed our money.” Did they mean to say that their money had been burned and annihilated into nonexistence? No. Rather, it had been spent or wasted, and thus no longer was of use to them.

Genesis 31:40 serves as a final example of the various ways the word “consumed” can be used. In this text, Jacob describes the hardships he endured during his tenure with Laban.

In that discussion, Jacob stated: “There I was! In the day the drought consumed me, and the frost by night, and my sleep departed from my eyes.” Was Jacob completely burned up or annihilated during the day? Not in any sense. Interestingly, the same Hebrew word is used in Genesis 31:40 that is used in Deuteronomy 4:24—which was cited by Hailey, and from which his Hebrews 12:29 quote is taken. It is evident, then, that the words “consume” and “consuming” do not necessarily connote complete annihilation, but can, and often do, make reference to a state of waste and ruin, or, as in Jacob’s case, pain, suffering and hardship.

It also is interesting to note that, among the examples given by Hailey that supposedly imply the annihilation of those things (or people) which were consumed, are the individuals who were consumed in the rebellion of Korah in Numbers 16. Yet in the New Testament, Jude offered divinely inspired commentary on certain sinful individuals, stating: “Woe to them! For they have gone in the way of Cain, have run greedily in the error of Balaam for profit, and perished in the rebellion of Korah” (vs. 11). Jude further commented that these sinners were “raging waves of the sea, foaming up their own shame; wandering stars for whom is reserved the blackness of darkness forever” (vs. 13). Therefore, these sinners had “perished in the rebellion of Korah,” and yet their souls were not completely consumed or annihilated, but had a reservation in a place where there was “blackness of darkness forever.” From the New Testament commentary offered by Jude, it is evident that those consumed in the rebellion of Korah did not go out of existence altogether, but that their physical lives were ended and their souls awaited a punishment in darkness forever.

Once again, an appeal to incomplete word studies in an attempt to force the idea of annihilationism on the biblical text is speculative and unfounded, to say the least. The overwhelming evidence of Scripture explicitly states and implicitly teaches that the souls of the wicked will be punished in the fires of hell forever—without respite.

REFERENCES

“Akal: 398” (1999), Logos Library System: Enhanced Strong’s Lexicon (Logos Research Systems: Bellingham, WA).

Hailey, Homer (2003), God’s Judgements & Punishments (Las Vegas, NV: Nevada Publications).

“Kalahl: 3615” (1999), Logos Library System: Enhanced Strong’s Lexicon (Logos Research Systems: Bellingham, WA).

A Christian Response to Descartes’ Radical Doubt by Caleb Colley, Ph.D.

http://apologeticspress.org/APContent.aspx?category=12&article=2790

A Christian Response to Descartes’ 

Radical Doubt

by	Caleb Colley, Ph.D.

Modern philosophy is said to begin with René Descartes (1596-1650; Copleston, 1994, 4:1). Many think that “René Descartes is perhaps the single most important thinker of the European Enlightenment” (Hooker, 2009; cf. Copleston, 4:174ff.). Descartes is thought to be “the father of the subjective and idealistic (as was Bacon of the objective and realistic) tradition in modern philosophy,” who “began the great game of epistemology, which in [sic] Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Kant waxed into a Three Hundred Years’ War that at once stimulated and devastated modern philosophy” (Durant, 1926, pp. 116,117, parenthetical item in orig.; cf. p. 268). First, I will summarize the historical/philosophical context of Descartes’ work, which will provide two things: (1) An overview of his motivations, and (2) an explanation of why the Christian apologist should be prepared to counter certain of Descartes’ arguments. Second, I will examine the nature of Descartes’ doubt, which is central to his philosophy. Finally, I will offer a critique from the Christian perspective.

CONTEXT

Burnham and Fieser observed: “Descartes’ philosophy developed in the context of the key features of Renaissance and early modern philosophy. Like the humanists, he rejected religious authority in the quest for scientific and philosophical knowledge” (see Kenny, 1968, p. 4; cf. Maritain, 1944, p. 55). Descartes was a devout Catholic, but was influenced by the Reformation’s challenge to Church authority and scholastic Aristotelianism (philosophy in the tradition of Aristotle’s thought; “René...,” 2008). Specifically, he was influenced by the scientific ideas of Leonardo da Vinci and Galileo Galilei (see Durant, 1926, p. 117). In 1633, the Catholic church condemned Galileo’s Dialogue because of its heliocentricity, and Descartes thought that his forthcoming work, Le Monde, would offend the church as well, so he postponed its publication (Galilei, 2001; “René...”; Fowler, 1996; Rodis-Lewis, 1992, p. 39; cf. Kenny, pp. 7-8). In fact, Descartes’ first major writing was published anonymously (see Cottingham, 1986, p.13).

In developing his rationalistic philosophy, Descartes positioned himself against scholasticism and Aristotelianism, as he explains in a letter to Voetius:

[T]he philosophy against which you rail with such violence...aims at the knowledge of the truths which are acquired by means of the natural light, and which promise the benefit of the human race; by contrast the dominant philosophy, which is taught in the schools and universities, is merely a muddled collection of opinions which are mostly open to doubts, as is proved by the debates that they occasion day after day, and which are entirely without practical benefit, as centuries of experience have proved only too well (quoted in Cottingham, p. 15; cf. Copleston, p. 174).

Descartes hoped that philosophy could be as certain as mathematics, the principles of which he saw as being exceptionally sound (1952a, 31:ix; 1952b, 31:14,31; cf. Loeb, 1992, p. 219; Rodis-Lewis, 1992, pp. 26ff.; Ree, 1975, pp. 28-34), and that his writings could replace traditional texts based on Aristotle (Ross, n.d.; cf. Cottingham, 16). “[H]e wanted to define an area in which everything could be completely explained by a reductionist, mechanistic physical science” (Ree, p. 91). “[T]he brand of knowledge Descartes seeks requires, at least, unshakably certain conviction,” and such knowledge he considered to be unavailable from authority or sense-perception (Newman, 2005). “Arithmetic, Geometry, and the other sciences of the same class, which regard merely the simplest and most general objects...contain somewhat that is certain and indubitable” (Descartes, 1952b, 31:77). Descartes challenged scholasticism generally because he thought that it had been convoluted by “jargon-manipulation and the juggling of authorities” as “the paramount road to academic advancement” (Cottingham, p. 5). [NOTE: The purpose of this article is not to assess scholasticism or Aristotelianism.]

Banach summarizes Descartes’ starting position: “In order to show that science rested on firm foundations and that these foundations lay in the mind and not the senses, Descartes began by bringing into doubt all the beliefs that come to us from the senses.... The obvious implication is that, since we do know that external objects exist, this knowledge cannot come to us through the senses, but through the mind” (n.d., parenthetical item in orig.). Maritain observed: “Descartes, on the contrary, who with the rest of the moderns makes science consist in invention rather than in judgment, has a hankering for a Science which with one and the same movement proves by discovering, and discovers by proving, established in complete certitude from its inception, rejecting of itself as an attempt against its being, every purely probable element” (1944, p. 55).

His method of acquiring this scientific conviction begins with doubt, which for Descartes took root in his general objection to his instructor’s methods (2007, p. 17). “[W]hen I considered the number of conflicting opinions touching a single matter that may be upheld by learned men, while there can be but one true, I reckoned as well-nigh false all that was only probable” (2007, p. 15). His doubt leads Descartes to the “insistence that philosophy should begin with the self and travel outward” (Durant, 1926, 336).

Whatever Descartes’ specific theological positions, his philosophical starting-point is dangerous to faith. Descartes’ project began by trusting in reason to the exclusion of revelation (both natural and special). This procedure is in contrast with Paul’s prescription: “For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead, so that they are without excuse” (Romans 1:20). It falls to the Christian apologist to reason properly about what God has revealed (see Warren, 1982), and to defend the faith against the attacks of doubt. God expects us to use our senses as we come to a knowledge of Him (1 John 1:1-3), so we must critically analyze any approach to knowledge that attempts an overthrow of empiricism. As Wilson noted, Descartes had “a general metaphysical vision of reality, and commitments to a special conception of what the world is like and how it works” (1978, p. 221). We must ask whether that metaphysical vision is consistent with Christianity.

CARTESIAN DOUBT

From the foregoing, it is obvious that Descartes became a rationalist. Generally speaking, a rationalist “accepts the supremacy of reason, and aims at establishing a system of philosophy and ethics independent of arbitrary assumptions and authority” (“FAQs,” n.d.). Descartes summarized his rationalist perspective: “[I]t is now manifest to me that bodies themselves are not properly perceived by the senses nor by the faculty of imagination, but by the intellect alone” (2007, p. 88). Descartes sought “an absolute foundation for knowledge by proposing to doubt all things and accept as knowledge (or at least as a foundation for knowledge) only what could not be doubted” (Cannon, 2001, parenthetical item in orig.). For Descartes, this narrowed the field of possible knowledge, leaving only that of which “the light of reason” or “the light of nature” provide assurance (see Markie, 1992, p. 147; cf. Maritain, 1944, pp. 50, 115):

I thought that a procedure exactly the opposite was called for, and that I ought to reject as absolutely false all opinions in regard to which I could suppose the least ground for doubt, in order to ascertain whether after that there remained aught in my belief that was wholly indubitable. Accordingly, seeing that our senses sometimes deceive us, I was willing to suppose that there existed nothing really such as they presented to us; and because some men err in reasoning, and fall into paralogisms (pieces of false reasoning)...I, convinced that I was open to error as any other, rejected as false all the reasonings I had hitherto taken for demonstrations (2007, p. 31, parenthetical item added).

Descartes had been troubled by the recognition that his senses deceived him on occasion. For example, “I considered that the very same thoughts (presentations) which we experience when awake may also be experienced when we are asleep, while there is at that time not one of them true” (2007, p. 31, parenthetical item in orig.; cf. pp. 76-77; cf. Wilson, 1978, pp. 17ff.). Furthermore, “Descartes cannot yet be certain if there are any bodies in existence. Since one cannot ‘sense’ unless there is body present (otherwise it is a dream or a hallucination or a mirage or an illusion)” (Mahon, n.d., parenthetical item in orig.). In examining why his senses deceived him, Descartes proposed the possibility of a deceptive demon. “[S]ome malignant demon, who is at once exceedingly potent and deceitful, has employed all his artifice to deceive me; I will suppose that the sky, the air, the earth, colors, figures, sounds, and all external things, are nothing better than the illusions of dreams, by which this being has laid snares for my credulity” (2007, pp. 78-79).

Descartes had disregarded empirical knowledge entirely (see 2007, p. 79), and settled on the one reality that, he believed, satisfied his radical criterion for truth:

But immediately upon this I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, I think, therefore I am (COGITO ERGO SUM), was so certain and of such evidence that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the skeptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in search (p. 31, parenthetical item and emp. in orig.).

Descartes focused on the one thing he believed is certain: that he is a “thinking thing” (2007, p. 84). He explained his rationale further in his Principles: “[W]hile rejecting in this way all those things which we can somehow doubt, and even imagining them to be false, we can indeed easily suppose that there is no God, no heaven, no material bodies; and even that we ourselves have no hands, or feet, in short, no body; yet we do not on that account suppose that we, who are thinking such things, are nothing” (p. 5). Cottingham observed: “The most striking feature about the accounts Descartes himself gives of the Cogito argument is that the certainty involved stems from the fact that the mediator has pushed his doubt to the limit.... [T]he very fact that I am around to entertain the doubt shows that I must exist” (p. 38).

Next, Descartes needed to develop a “permanent system of knowledge” from his theory of doubt (see Cottingham, p. 42). Wilson explained: “The upshot of the argument of the Meditations is that an external physical world can be proved to exist, thus in a sense affirming what everyone ‘knew’ all along; but the proof turns out to be arduous and to require immaterialist premises: people are wrong in thinking the direct evidence of the senses is sufficient” (p. 45). In this process of rebuilding the knowledge he previously deconstructed via radical doubt, Descartes reintroduced God. This move was essential to Descartes’ conviction that material objects exist:

Is there not a God...who causes these thoughts to arise in my mind? But why suppose such a being, for it may be I myself am capable of producing them? ... And in truth, as I have no ground for believing that Deity is deceitful, and as, indeed, I have not even considered the reasons by which the existence of a Deity of any kind is established, the ground of doubt that rests only on this supposition is very slight, and, so to speak, metaphysical (2007, pp. 81,90).

Descartes insisted that of all his perceptions of external objects, including his own body, the notion of God “has certainly in it more objective reality than those ideas by which finite substances are represented,” and that the effects of his perceptions must have correlative causes (2007, pp. 92-93). “And how could the cause communicate to it this reality unless it possessed it in itself? And hence it follows...that the more perfect, in other words, that which contains in itself more reality, cannot be the effect of the less perfect” (p. 93). Since Descartes clearly had an idea of God in his consciousness, and since he believed himself incapable of originating this idea independent of some exterior force on his intellect, then he concluded that that Being caused the idea (see pp. 94-97).

I should not, however, have the idea of an infinite substance, seeing I am a finite being, unless it were given me by some substance in reality infinite.... The idea, I say, of a being supremely perfect, and infinite, is in the highest degree true; for although, perhaps, we may imagine that such a being does not exist, we cannot, nevertheless, suppose that his idea represents nothing real, as I have already said of the idea of cold. It is likewise clear and distinct in the highest degree, since whatever the mind clearly and distinctly conceives as real or true, and as implying any perfection, is contained entire in this idea (pp. 96,97).

Hence Descartes did away with the demon, concluding that it is impossible for God, being perfect, to deceive him (p. 103). “[H]e is no deceiver...” (p. 115).

Having reached a conviction that God is real, Descartes proceeded to claim partial knowledge of material objects by virtue of God’s grace:

I cannot deny that we may have produced many other objects, or at least that he is able to produce them, so that I may occupy a place in the relation of a part to the great whole of his creatures.... And although there are perhaps innumerable objects in the world of which I have no idea in my understanding, it cannot, on that account be said that I am deprived of those ideas as of something that is due to my nature, but simply that I do not possess them, because, in truth, there is no ground to prove that Deity ought to have endowed me with a larger faculty of cognition than he has actually bestowed upon me (p. 105; cf. pp.112-113).

On Descartes’ account, humans can be certain that they possess knowledge only because God exists and can be trusted not to deceive.

CRITIQUE

Consider three problems with Descartes’ approach to knowledge: First, “Insistence upon a standard of absolute certainty eliminates the middle ground of reasonable evidence. It suggests that if you don’t have complete certainty you have no evidence at all” (Cannon, 2001). Anthony Kenny summarizes this objection: “Few would quarrel with the starting point: it is true that we grow up uncritically accepting many beliefs which may be false. But is it necessary, in order to rectify this, that we should on some occasion call in question all our beliefs? Can we not correct them piecemeal?” (p. 18). If, for example, when I strike my fist against a wall, I have an insufficient level of certainty that the wall is real, then what level of certainty is needed? Human beings necessarily operate on a level of faith in their senses, but that faith is biblical (as we will see), and certainly sufficient for human existence.

Kant points out that the Cogito falls short of proving Descartes’ point, because it also is an empirical notion: “The ‘I think’ is...an empirical proposition, and contains the expression, ‘I exist.’ But I cannot say ‘Everything, which thinks, exists;’ for in this case the property of thought would constitute all beings possessing it, necessary beings. Hence my existence cannot be considered as an inference from the proposition ‘I think,’ as Descartes maintained” (2003, p. 225). Also, Kenny raises the question of identity: “Is not Descartes rash in christening the substance in which the doubts of the Meditations inhere ‘ego’? To be sure, he explains that he is not yet committing himself to any doctrine about the nature of the ego.... But what ‘I’ refers to must at least be distinct from what ‘you’ refers to; otherwise the argument might as well run ‘cogitatur, ergo es’ (“thought exists, therefore, you are”) as ‘cogito ergo sum’ (“I think, therefore I am)” (1968, p. 62, parenthetical items added).

Second, “Insistence upon absolute clarity and distinctness to the skeptical reflecting mind eliminates consideration of any respect in which reality transcends full and determinate representation” (Cannon). Indeed, the very fact that Descartes knew that his senses occasionally “deceived” him, demonstrates that his senses usually (typically) provided him with accurate perceptions. The Bible teaches that we generally can place confidence in our senses, even to the degree of sinning, recognizing the need for salvation, and accessing remission of sins (e.g., Genesis 13:15; Matthew 5:13; Acts 13:44; John 20:24-30; etc.). Descartes’ argument is intelligible only if the illusive nature of dreams, for example, does not inhibit our general understanding of reality. Kant, therefore, emphasizes the need for “sensuous phenomena” in the “empirical world” while recognizing its limitations—even if they are God-given (2003, pp. 42,43,316; 1952, 42:337). In the Fourth Meditation, Descartes would seem to agree: “I have no reason...to think that it was obligatory on [God] to give to each of his works all the perfections he is able to bestow upon some” (2007, p. 105).

In this context, it is remarkable that Descartes moves swiftly from doubting his senses, to relying on them (and problematically placing the seat of empirical knowledge in the pineal gland; see Lockhorst, 2008; cf. Kenny, pp. 225-226):

And as I observed that in the words “I think, therefore I am,” there is nothing at all which gives me assurance of their truth beyond this, that I see very clearly that in order to think it is necessary to exist, I concluded that I might take, as a general rule, the principle, that all things which we very clearly and distinctly conceive are true, only observing, however, that there is some difficulty in rightly determining the objects which we distinctly conceive (2007, p. 32).

Perhaps this occurs because Descartes did not wish to be separated from the reality he knew prior to settling on the Cogito: “Proposing to rebuild one’s knowledge from the ground up because a number of things that once seemed true have become doubtful or false, as Descartes does, is a lot like being in a boat out on the ocean and proposing to abandon ship in order to rebuild the boat from the keel up just because it has developed a few leaks” (Cannon).

Third, Descartes did not provide a convincing reason for his rejection of the possibility that a demon was placing false ideas in his consciousness. Because all of Descartes’ evidence was rational, and none of it was empirical, his basis for thinking that God exists was a “clear and distinct” idea of a Person, “infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful” (2007, pp. 96,97). Why could that idea not have been placed in Descartes’ mind by a god who is actually deceitful? Descartes finished where he started, but not prior to attempting an overthrow of empiricism. His pre-existing belief in God rescued Descartes from his own personal skepticism; but what of those readers who find his argument for the existence of God unconvincing? The truth is that God appeals to us by presenting us with biblical and extra-biblical evidence that agrees with our observation and rationality, all of which ultimately are derived from Him (Jeremiah 51:15).

CONCLUSION

Descartes’ radical doubt, which would entail dispensing with all epistemological knowledge, also would place an insurmountable roadblock to biblical faith. However, his doubt has been shown to be invalid. It is telling that rationalists still maintain a certain scientific epistemology (“FAQs,” n.d.). Perhaps we can hypothesize, with Maritain, that pride ultimately led Descartes to his radical doubt (pp. 33-62):

The pride of human knowledge appears thus as the very substance, solid and resistant, of rationalist hopes. Pride, a dense pride without frivolity or distraction, as stable as virtue, as vast a geometric extension, bitter and restless as the ocean, takes possession of Descartes to such an extent that it would seem the universal form of his interior workings and the principle of all his suffering (p. 56).

This is a stark contrast to Christ’s portrait of those who are pleasing to Him: “Whoever humbles himself as this little child is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven” (Matthew 18:15).

In light of Descartes’ major contributions to modern science and mathematics, it is remarkable that his doubt also led him to a radical distinction between mind and body, which we will not detail or critique here (it has been done elsewhere: see Hatfield, 1992, pp. 335-370; Kenny, 1968, pp. 216-226; Wilson, 1978, pp. 50-99). Ree summarized the necessity for this dualism: “[H]is dualism of mental and physical properties implied that since human beings had minds, they were more than mere parts of an all-engulfing physical universe” (p. 100). The connection between Descartes’ epistemology and his physiology, in light of the biblical doctrine of mind and body, would be the next logical step in this inquiry. [NOTE: Special thanks to Michael R. Young, Ph.D., for help with research.]

REFERENCES

Banach, David (n.d.), “Important Arguments from Descartes’ Meditations,” Anselm University, [On-line], URL: http://www.anselm.edu/homepage/dbanach/dcarg.htm.

Burnham, Douglas and James Fieser (2006), “René Descartes,” University of Tennessee at Martin, [On-line], URL: http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/d/descarte.htm.

Cannon, Dale (2001), “Descartes,” Western Oregon University, [On-line], URL:http://www.wou.edu/las/humanities/cannon/descartes.htm.

Copleston, Frederick (1994), A History of Philosophy (New York: Doubleday).

Cottingham, John (1986), Descartes (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell).

Descartes, René (1952a reprint), Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, ed. Robert M. Hutchins (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago).

Descartes, René (1952b reprint), Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, ed. Robert M. Hutchins (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago).

Descartes, René (1983 reprint), Principles of Philosophy, trans. Valentine Rodger Miller and Reese P. Miller (Boston, MA: D. Reidel).

Descartes, René (2007 reprint), Discourse on Method/Meditations on First Philosophy (Illinois: Barnes & Noble).

Durant, Will (1926), The Story of Philosophy (New York: Simon & Schuster).

“FAQs” (n.d.), Rationalist Society of Australia, [On-line], URL:http://www.rationalist.com.au/faqs.htm.

Fowler, Michael (1996), “Life of Galileo,” University of Virginia, [On-line], URL:http://galileo.phys.virginia.edu/classes/109N/lectures/gal_life.htm.

Galilei, Galileo (2001 reprint), Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems (New York: Modern Library).

Hatfield, Gary (1992), “Descartes’ Physiology and Its Relation to His Psychology,” The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University).

Hooker, Richard (2009), “The European Enlightenment: René Descartes,” Washington State University, [On-line], URL: http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/ENLIGHT/DESCARTE.HTM.

Kant, Immanuel (1952 reprint), Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, ed. Robert M. Hutchins (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1952).

Kant, Immanuel (2003 reprint), Critique of Pure Reason (Mineola, NY: Dover).

Kenny, Anthony (1968), Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy (New York: Random House).

Lockhorst, Gert-Jan (2008), “Descartes and the Pineal Gland,” Stanford University, [On-line],URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pineal-gland/#2.

Loeb, Louis E. (1992), “The Cartesian Circle,” The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press).

Mahon, James (n.d.), “Meditation II,” Washington and Lee University, [On-line], URL:http://home.wlu.edu/~mahonj/Descartes.M1.Mind.htm.

Maritain, Jaques (1944), The Dream of Descartes, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (New York: Philosophical Library).

Markie, Peter (1992), “The Cogito and Its Importance,” The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University).

Newman, Lex (2005), “Descartes’ Epistemology,” Stanford University, [On-line], URL:http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology/.

Ree, Jonathan (1975), Descartes (New York: Pica).

“René Descartes (1596-1650)” (2008), The European Graduate School, [On-line], URL:http://www.egs.edu/resources/descartes.html.

Rodis-Lewis, Genevieve (1992), “Descartes’ Life and the Development of His Philosophy,” The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University).

Ross, George Macdonald (n.d.), “Descartes Texts,” University of Leeds, [On-line], URL:http://www.philosophy.leeds.ac.uk/GMR/hmp/texts/modern/descartes/dcintro.html.

Warren, Thomas B. (1982), Logic and the Bible (Ramer, TN: National Christian Press).

Wilson, Margaret Dauler (1978), Descartes (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).