http://apologeticspress.org/APContent.aspx?category=11&article=3749
The Problematic Concept of a Sinful Human Nature
| by | Caleb Colley, Ph.D. |
It is fashionable in some religious circles to teach that human nature
is sinful, i.e., we all have a “sinful nature.” If this is supposed to
mean merely that all accountable persons at some point sin, and need
forgiveness, then the doctrine of a sinful nature is biblical (Romans
3:23; 1 John 1:8-10). However, the very words “sinful nature,” and much
of the discussion surrounding it, often denote the doctrine of
hereditary depravity. This is the idea that all humans inherit the sin
of Adam in some way—we suffer due to this original sin, and therefore we
all are inescapably sinful by nature. The biblical evidence militates
against this idea, as we have shown previously (see Pinedo, 2009; Colley, 2004; Butt,
2004). The very concept of a sinful human nature is also
philosophically problematic. Indeed, the concept of a sinful nature is
plagued with difficulties even before the Bible is consulted.
Consider a preliminary remark concerning what it means to speak of a
sinful human nature. To speak of human “nature” at all is to refer to
qualities that are essential to all humans. Such characteristics cannot
be accidental, or things that might become characteristic of a human as he develops, but might also not. Rather, aspects of human nature
are inseparable from whatever it is that makes us human (with the
possible exceptions of young children and the mentally ill). For
example, we might admit that human nature is essentially rational (this
is part of what differentiates us from animals), but not essentially
football-loving, because there are plenty of humans who seem not
(however mysteriously!) to appreciate football. Someone who thinks that
we become sinful when we transgress God’s law does not believe in the
essentially sinful human nature.
To ascribe a sinful nature to humanity, therefore, is to say that there
is something sinful about being a human being. What part of our being
might be accused of inherent sinfulness? If we think that a human being
consists of a body and a soul, there are three possibilities: (1) The
body could introduce guilt; (2) The soul could introduce guilt; (3) The
union of body and soul could itself produce guilt.
First, someone could allege that sin comes as a result of our
embodiment. Indeed, the idea that the body unavoidably mars the
perfection of the soul has been popular at times. For example, the
Gnostics taught that matter is intrinsically evil and is the source of
all evil (see Renwick, 1982, 2:490). How may moral blame attach to human
nature as it arises from our bodies? We are typically unprepared to
blame purely material objects such as tables and chairs. Genes and brain
matter are different from tables and chairs, but it is nonsensical to
look for a difference that would give rise to moral guilt. As yet, there
is no good explanation to convince us that evil arises simply from
matter. (Yet, we might use our bodies to do wrong. Indeed, all sins are
committed while we are “in the body” [2 Corinthians 5:10]).
On the other hand, someone who believes in sinful human nature might be
(and probably is) referring to the status of the soul rather than the
body. Before assessing the possibility of the essential blameworthiness
of the human soul, consider that for someone to think of the soul as
essentially sinful, there are some concepts of soul which he must
reject. For example, the Aristotelian view of the soul as being the
animating force of the body, or that which activates the body’s
potential, does not allow for the human to “start out” as blameworthy.
Guilt, on this view, cannot arise from outside of the human order,
because Aristotle does not posit a supernatural being to ascribe the
guilt. Furthermore, humans could not possibly claim to know that a
newborn baby was already guilty if they did not think that God had
ascribed guilt to the baby from outside the human order.
Likewise, the Stoic idea of a Universe-Soul is problematic for the idea
of an essentially sinful soul. If we all share in the same soul, which
also gives life to everything else in the Universe, then to ascribe
guilt to that soul would be to say that everything is altogether evil.
If everything is evil, how would we know what good is? And what is the
point of discussing sinful human nature if we think there is no rescue
from it?
There are other conceptions of soul that would a priori disallow
a sinful nature. If we presuppose, however, that the soul is distinct
from the body (i.e., it is its own, separable substance) and comes to
the body from elsewhere (from heaven or wherever), then we have at least
a format that might allow for the essential guilt of the soul. In this
format, we are free to suppose that the soul acquires guilt prior to
entering the body, at which time human nature is indeed guilty. There
are two problems with this, however: (1) We could not know about such an
arrangement unless it were revealed to us. Plato’s theory of
reincarnation is beautiful and interesting, but like other theories of
reincarnation, is not readily amenable to proof (Socrates’ “proofs” in
the Meno [Plato, 1997, pp. 870-897] and the Phaedo
[pp. 49-100] are notoriously problematic). A person has just as much
reason to deny the existence of souls prior to their embodiment as he
does to assert such existence, because the spiritual realm does not
appear to us. (2) Most people who want to establish sinful human nature
presumably would not be interested in the guilt of a soul prior to
embodiment, because sin is supposed to be passed along from one embodied
soul to another embodied soul. If we suppose that a new soul acquires
guilt while it waits in heaven to be born into the world, we would need
an additional story about where this guilt comes from. Such a story does
not seem to be forthcoming. Because reincarnation is not evident (and
seldom proposed by supporters of the sinful human nature), then there is
no obvious way to ascribe the sin of a previous human to a soul not yet
embodied.
The only remaining option is that the soul becomes sinful at the time
when it is embodied, at the occasion of the union of soul and body. If
the soul is innocent prior to embodiment—and as we have seen, there is
no obvious reason to think it guilty—then the body is the substance that
is responsible for the guilt in the union. We have already shown the
difficulty of associating blame with matter. Furthermore, recall that
the common view of sinful nature is that we have inherited the sins
of an ancestor. His soul was guilty, not because of contact with
matter, but because of his own sinful volition. This was the “original”
sin. Guilt was introduced on this occasion, but did not exist prior.
This ancestor did not inherit guilt, so matter, at least in his case,
did not bring sin. Why should we think matter brings sin in our case?
CONCLUSION
One response in favor of sinful nature might be that it is a spiritual,
theological matter, and thus a philosopher will not find it if he
searches for it (e.g., Hodge, 2010). This is an appeal to the limits of
philosophy, and would be a well-taken point if God had revealed a
logically coherent doctrine of original sin that was not obvious apart
from revelation. However, He has not done this. In fact, He has revealed
information to the opposite effect. Glory be to God, Who does not blame
us for the sins of our ancestors (Ezekiel 18:20).
REFERENCES
Butt, Kyle (2004), “Do Children Inherit the Sins of Their Parents?,” http://apologeticspress.org/articles/2543.
Colley, (2004), “Did David Authorize Infant Baptism?,” http://apologeticspress.org/articles/2626.
Hodge, Bodie, “Is Original Sin (Sin Nature) Passed through the Father’s
Genetic Line?,”
http://www.answersingenesis.org/articles/2010/02/23/satan-the-fall-good-evil-how-is-original-sin-passed.
Pinedo, Moisés (2009), “Are Children Born With Sin?,” http://apologeticspress.org/articles/240109.
Plato, Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett).
Renwick, A. M. (1982), “Gnosticism,” The International Standard Bible Encyclopedia, ed. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans).
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